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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

A.

In this case,

two brothers, Brent Kyser (“Brent”) and Billy Kyser,

Jr.

(“Billy”), are the

beneﬁciaries 0f their mother’s estate. The mother’s will bequeathed her estate t0 Brent and Billy

Brent was the personal

in equal shares, with Billy’s share held in trust for his beneﬁt.

representative 0f his mother’s estate.

Brent and Billy’s mother

commenced

a divorce from their father in 2000.

ﬁnalized a property settlement agreement related t0 their divorce in 2002.
settlement agreement, which

was reached between

As

The parents

part 0f the property

the mother and the father without assistance 0f

their respective counsel, the parents agreed t0 retain conditional sequential life estates in the

community
tenants in

real property (“the

common upon

home

place”), with the remainder going to Brent and Billy as

the death 0f the last surviving parent.

In 2002, a quitclaim deed

which

both the attorney for the mother and the attorney for the father participated in drafting, was
recorded with these terms (“the 2002 Deed”). The father passed in 2004. The mother passed June
28, 201

1.

By

operation 0f law,

possession 0f the

mother’s

home

upon

the mother’s death, Brent and Billy

place as tenants in

common. The home

had the

place

right t0

was never an

immediate
asset 0f the

estate.

Craig Wise (“Wise”) was the attorney
participated in drafting the

2002 Deed.

property settlement agreement
proceeding.

Wise

who

represented the mother in her divorce.

also drafted the mother’s will in

was placed 0f record before

2002

He

after the

the magistrate judge in the divorce

Approximately nine years

201

later in

1,

Wise was hired by Brent

t0 represent

A probate was opened July

personal representative in the probate 0f his mother’s will.

him
12,

as the

201

1.

Brent also requested Wise represent him individually in 2012 t0 prepare a quitclaim deed

from Billy
deed

to

t0 Billy

Brent transferring Billy’s interest in the
with a transmittal

letter disclosing

that Billy sign the quitclaim deed,

returned the executed deed t0

A malpractice

suit

home

directed

the

he represented Brent, explaining Brent’s request

and indicating Billy could sign the deed

Wise and

Wise forwarded

place t0 Brent.

Wise

t0 record

was brought 0n behalf 0f Billy

if he so chose.

Brent

it.

alleging

Wise owed

Billy a duty as a

beneﬁciary 0f the mother, that he owed Billy a duty as an unrepresented person, and he owed Billy
a duty as an incapacitated person,

all

0f which he breached by preparing the 2002 Deed, the 2002

Will and the 2012 Deed.

The
will

district court

held Wise breached the duty 0f care

by preparing the 2012 Deed. Observing

that the

The duty

will

when Viewed

be divided equally between her two sons

the district court held Wise, as an attorney

who drafted a will, and then represented

owed

a duty 0f care t0 the beneﬁciary 0f the

a personal representative in the probate 0f the will,

will.

Billy as a beneﬁciary 0f the

2002 Deed and Carolyn’s

in unity evidenced Carolyn’s intent that her entire estate

upon her death,.

owed

the district court found

Wise owed

t0 the beneﬁciaries

was

t0 assure

any property

received outside 0f probate jointly by the beneﬁciaries from the testator 0f the will continue t0 be

held in the same manner
preparing the 2012

it

was

Deed because

This holding by the

received.

it

The

district court

found Wise breached

this

duty by

frustrated Carolyn’s testamentary intent.

district court

extended the narrow exception t0 priVity and duty t0 a

third-party beneﬁciary established in Harrigfeld

v.

Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 137, 90 P.3d 884, 887

(2004). This appeal addresses this expansion 0f the duty 0f care.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

B.

In an unusual posture, this suit

Kalb as Conservator for

R pp.

Law.

An
Plaintiff’s

13-22.1

Billy, pro se,

An Answer was

Order Setting Trial and

was purportedly commenced August
by and through attorney Fonda

R pp.

ﬁled October 20, 2017.
Pretrial

An Amended

Disclosure

Order were entered April 23, 2018.

was ﬁled November

Complaint was ﬁled November

Amended Complaint was ﬁled January 25,

L. Jovick with

9,

R pp.

2019.

1,

R

R pp.

2018.

2018.

R

by David
Lake City

23-27.

Expert Witness Disclosure was ﬁled October 29, 201 8.

Amended Expert Witness

28, 2017,

R

pp. 34-37.

pp. 28-33.

Plaintiff’s

38-42.

pp. 43-56.

An Answer

t0 the

126-13 1.

A Motion for summary Judgment and supporting pleadings were ﬁled November 9, 201 8.
R

pp. 57-75.

court’s

Plaintiff’s

Memorandum

Opposition was ﬁled December

R pp.

18,

2019.

On February

19,

20 1 9, Defendant ﬁled

A

supporting

2018.

R

pp. 76-1 15.

Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for

was entered January

items.

5,

district

Summary Judgment

116-125.

memorandum and

its

Motion in Limine concerning

declaration were also ﬁled.

R

certain evidentiary

pp. 188-197.

response in opposition t0 Defendant’s motion in limine was ﬁled February 20, 210.

20 1.

The

Plaintiff’s

R pp.

198-

A reply memorandum in support of the motion in limine was ﬁled February 22, 2019. R pp.

202-207.

1

At trial, Ms. Jovick explained to

I.C. §

was appointed the guardian ad litem
Ms. Jovick indicated she believed
ﬁle pleadings, including a separate lawsuit. The pleadings

the Court that she brought the suit because she

for Billy in a separate proceeding in

Shoshone County. Tr

15-5-3 16(1) allowed the guardian ad litem to

p. 7,

1.

23 —

p. 9,

1.

12.

reference in this code section refer to pleadings in the guardianship matter. Nonetheless, the district court struck the

pro se designation and allowed the case to
for Billy.

move forward

as

though Lake City represented David Kalb, as conservator

Thereafter, Plaintiff ﬁled a supplemental exhibit

disclosure

R p.

7.

It

lasted for

The
2019.

two days.

R pp.

A bench trial

commenced February

26, 2019.

Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Court Trial on May

A judgment was issued the same day. R p. 577-578.

542-576.

2019.

443-469.

Id.

district court issued its

R pp.

May 22,

R pp.

0n February 25, 2019.

and supplemental expert witness

list

17,

This appeal was ﬁled

579-582.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

C.

The

facts

found by the

district court are set forth in its opinion.

R pp.

544-554. The facts

relevant t0 this appeal are the following.

David Kalb

1.

is

Billy’s uncle,

Kalb has known Billy since he was a baby.

August

3,

Finding

Kyser

Bill E.

2.

R p.

Bill

545, Finding

Jr.

(“Billy”) and Brent A.

and Carolyn divorced 0n February

3.

Billy has a very

4.

Billy

2.

and Carolyn A. Kyser (“Carolyn”) were married 0n

Sr., (“Bill”)

1968, and had two children, Billy

3.

the brother 0f Billy’s father, Bill E. Kyser, Sr.

i.e.,

10w mental

Kyser (“Brent”).

capacity.

R p.

545, Finding

4.

R p. 45, Finding 5.

His mental development plateaued when he was starting out in grade school, and that
less the level at

his reading

which he functioned

comprehension was

gradually in his 20$ and 30$.

Id.

at the

R p.

grade level.

8.

He

At

is

more 0r

the peak 0f Billy’s competency,

Id.

His mental capacity declined

at the

time 0f trial was

what he has read has dropped.

Wise was an Idaho licensed attorney in the

544, Finding

Id.

His reading comprehension

2nd grade level. Id. His capacity t0 retain

5.

time 0f trial.

at the 4th 0r 5th

545,

16, 2001. Id.

but functions nowhere near that age level.

is

R p.

down

t0 the

Id.

active practice 0f law at the time 0f trial.

obtained his law license 0n September 21, 1979.

Id.

His practice was

He

located in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. Id.

He was known

practiced throughout Idaho’s First Judicial District. Id.

as a general practitioner. Id.

R p.

6.

Wise represented Carolyn

7.

Wise, 0n behalf 0f Carolyn, drafted and ﬁled her Complaint for Divorce in Kootenai

in her divorce

County Case CV-2000-7734, Carolyn A. Kyser

from

Bill.

VS. Billy E. Kyser.

Complaint was signed by both Wise and Carolyn 0n December

4,

At

9.

Bill did not timely

a result, a decree

the time 0f the divorce, Billy and Brent

was entered

against

16,

him by
2001.

default. Id.

Wise

p.

9.

The

546, Finding 10.

Id.

Carolyn veriﬁed the

4th. Id.

adults.

respond t0 the Complaint for Divorce.

was entered by the Court 0n February

R p.

546, Finding 11.

R p.

547, Finding 13.

drafted that Decree 0f Divorce,

As

and

it

Id.

The Decree 0f Divorce entered in Kootenai County Case CV-2000-7734 was subsequently

10.

set aside as t0 the division

the divorce

were

R

2000.

Complaint before Wise, acting as notary public, also 0n December
8.

546, Finding

ofproperty and debts.

R p. 547, Finding

14.

These remaining issues attendant t0

were ultimately determined in Bonner County Case CV—2001 - 1046, Carolyn A. Kyser vs.

Billy

E. Kyser. Id.

Wise discussed With his

11.

issues.

Tr

p.

244,

11.

2-4.

client

Based upon those

Counterproposals were received. Tr p. 244,
division 0f property

12.

1.

how she wanted t0 resolve the division 0f property and debt

discussions,

12- p. 245,

Wise made

1.

2.

offers t0 settle.

At some point

Tr

p.

in the magistrate division

0n January

7,

11.

5-1

1.

in time, the clients settled the

and debt themselves Without the assistance 0f their attorneys. Tr p. 245,

At a hearing

244,

1.

3-6.

2002, in Bonner County Case

CV-

200 1 - 1046, Bill Sr. and Carolyn orally placed 0n the record their agreement resolving the remaining disputes
in the action.

R p. 548, Finding 16. On February 15, 2002, they executed a Property Settlement Agreement

before a notary public, reciting in writing the terms previously placed 0n the record Which included a Property

Settlement Agreement. Id.

Wise

13.

drafted the

Judgment

in

Bonner County Case CV2001-1046, Which resolved the

property division and debt allocation issues attendant t0 the divorce.

was entered by the Magistrate Court 0n February 27, 2002.

Id.

R p.

548, Finding 18.

The Judgment

A copy 0fthe Property Settlement Agreement

was attached thereto. Id.
Paragraph

14.

Carolyn wished t0 divide

E

0f the Property Settlement Agreement

their

set forth the

manner in which Bill and

community real property and mobile home:

As t0 the real property and mobile home, the parties agree t0 execute a Deed granting t0
life estate in and t0 said property. If any 0f the following conditions come into
real property and mobile home shall g0 t0 Wife With her receiving a life estate
the
existence,

E.

Husband a

With the same conditions being required 0f Wife as 0f Husbandj Whereaﬁer the property
shall

g0

t0 the

Husband and Wife's

children (remainder interest), Billy E. Kyser,

Jr.

and

Brent A. Kyser:

R p. 548, Finding 19.
15.

Deed.

In conformance With Paragraph 8(E) 0f the Property Settlement Agreement,

R p. 549, Finding 22.

Wise

drafted a

The deed quitclaimed the home place as follows:

unto Bill E. Kyser, Sn, a

life estate,

and then t0 Carolyn A. Kyser a life
,

estate,

and then,

Brent Kyser, a married person dealing in his sole and separate property, and Billy Kyser,

an unmarried person, as tenants in common, as t0 the remainder interest

.

.

t0

Jr.,

.

R p. 549, Finding 22.
The deed was executed by

Bill

and Carolyn before and recorded

in

Boundary County 0n April

2,

2002

(Instrument N0. 205524) (“2002 Deed”). Id.

16.

2- 12.

Wise’s

draft

0f the 2002 Deed was forwarded t0

Bill’s attorney,

Vogel reviewed and requested changes t0 the deed. Tr p. 233,

1.

Vogel’s changes t0 the 2002 Deedj Wise met With Carolyn 0n March

Tr p. 234,

2002

in

1.

13-15. For ministerial reasons, Carolyn re-signed the

Boundary County. Tr p. 234,

1.

20-25.

Paul Vogel. Tr

22 — p. 234,
19,

1.

8.

p.

248,

11.

After incorporating

2002, and she executed the deed.

same deed along With Bill 0n March 28,

Wise

17.

drafted Carolyn’s Last Will

hereby devise and bequeath the entire 0f my estate t0
equal shares.

,

1.

my children,

549, Finding 23.

The

will read “I

Brent Kyser and Billy E. Kyser,

Jr.,

in

Id.

The Will was not

18.

24 — 25 1

R p.

and Testament.

drafted until after the February 22, 2019, divorce judgment.

Tr p. 250,

1.

9.

0n 0r about 2004.

R p. 550, Finding 28.

19.

Bill died

20.

Carolyn died 0n 0r about June 28, 201 1.

21.

On

July 12, 201

1,

R p. 550, Finding 29.

Wise, acting as the attorney for personal representative Brent ﬁled an

"Application for Informal Probate 0f Will and Informal Appointment 0f Personal Representative"

in

Kootenai County Case CV—201 1-5575, In the matter 0fthe Estate 0f Carolyn A. Kyser Deceased (hereafter,
,

"probate case").

attorney

1,

Finding 30.

through July 27, 2015,

Kevin Waite
23.

R p.

1,

Wise served as attorney 0f record for personal representative Brent in the probate case ﬁom

22.

July 12, 201

R p. 550-55

for Wise.

In August 20 1 2,

When

R p. 55

1

,

a Notice 0f Substitution 0f Counsel was ﬁledj substituting in

Finding 32.

Wise draﬁedj at Brent's request, a Quitclaim Deed (hereafter, "20 1 2 Deed").

55 1, Finding 33. The 2012 Deed conveyed

Billy's one-half remainder interest in the subject property

t0 Brent, as follows:

GRANTOR,

Billy Kyser Jr., an unmarried person, for good and valuable consideration,
ofwhich is hereby acknowledged, does hereby REMISE, RELEASE and forever
QUITCLAIM unto Brent Kyser, an unmarried person, GRANTEE, and t0 grantee's heirs
and assigns forever, all 0f [the subject property].
,

the receipt

R p. 551, Finding 33.
24.

estate t0 prepare

separate

Wise

testiﬁed that: "I

was requested 0n behalf 0f Brent Kyser

a deed for his brother t0 sign Wise testiﬁed that:

and apart ﬁom the

estate t0 prepare

"I

separate

and apart

ﬁom the

was requested 0n behalf 0f Brent Kyser

a deed for his brother t0 sign.

R pp. 55

1

-552, Finding 34.

25

Wise recognized the property was the same as in the 2002 Deed in Which Billy had received

.

a remainder interest.

R p. 552, Finding 35.

When Wise ﬁnished prepan'ng the 2012 Deedj Wise, at Brent' s request, mailed it t0 Billy t0

26.

be executed. R p. 552, Finding 36.

He obtained Billy's mailing address ﬁom Brent, and included

a transmittal

letter. Id.

Wise’s transmittal

27.

c/o Terri

Koontz

[sic].

Re: Quitclaim

Dear

I

letter,

dated August 24, 20 12, was addressed t0 “Billy Kyser,

Jr.,

Wise wrote:

In the letter,

Deed

Billy:

represent your brother, Brent Kyser, in legal matters, including the administration of your

You and your

now

owners 0f your parent's property in Boundary
County, located in Section 26, including the mobile home.
Brent desires that at this time you deed your interest in the property over to him. If you agree,
mother’s estate.

brother are

the

I

your review, enclosed. Please review and sign before a notary
forward on to your brother.
return
to
or
either
thereafter
me,
and
public,
or comments.
questions
if
have
Please contact me
you

have prepared a draﬁ Quitclaim Deed

for

Sincerely,

CRAIG

R.

WISE,

P.A.

Craig R. Wise
Enclosures
cc:

R p.
28.

Brent Kyser

552, Finding 37.

Brent returned the executed 2012 Deed t0 Mr. Wise.

been signed by Billy before
II.

1.

Did

s

Notary Public.

Id.

Wise recorded

ISSUES PRESENTED

the district court impermissibly

Harrigfeld that Wise

owed

R p.

552, Finding 39.

It

had

the deed. Id.

ON APPEAL

expand the duty 0f care established

in

Billy as a third party beneﬁciary 0f a testamentary

instrument?

2.

Did

the district court err in

ﬁnding

that

Wise breached

the standard 0f care

Billy as a third party beneﬁciary 0f a testamentary instrument based

Rules 0f Professional Conduct prohibiting a conﬂict 0f interest?

owed

upon Idaho

Did the district court err in holding Wise breached a duty 0f care owed
which proximately caused Billy’s claimed injury?

3.

t0 Billy

ARGUMENT

III.

Standard 0f Review

A.

The existence 0f a duty 0f care
review." Jones

v.

is

a question 0f law over which this Court exercises free

Stames, 150 Idaho 257, 260, 245 P.3d 1009, 1012 (201

client relationship exists is a question

0f fact. Berry

v.

Whether an attorney-

1).

McFarland, 153 Idaho

5, 9,

278 P.3d 407,

411 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“This Court will not disturb ﬁndings 0f fact 0n appeal that are supported by substantial and

competent evidence, even
Silva

Land

if there is

C0., 162 Idaho 385, 389,

Substantial and competent evidence

support a conclusion. Id. (quoting

conﬂicting evidence at

is

Lamar

Corp.

Kinney

Competent evidence

is

v.

relevant evidence

it

t0

is

more than a

which a reasonable mind
scintilla

and

less than a

not deﬁned..

v.

(Bryan A. Gardner

ed., 9th ed.,

(i.e.,

West 2009)

admissible evidence and relevant evidence.

make the

0f the action more probable 0r

evidence. I.R.E. 401; State

Bookmark

is

Law Dictionary 636

relevant if it has any tendency t0

t0 the determination

t0

City 0f Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 42-43, 981

v.

legally admissible evidence that tends t0 prove the matter in dispute

deﬁnes competent evidence with reference
is

mind might accept

Tupperware C0., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990).

relevant and material). Black’s

Evidence

LLC v.

Bookmark not deﬁned.

relevant evidence that a reasonable

t0 support the conclusion reached;

preponderance.

Green River Ranches,

397 P.3d 1144, 1148 (2017).Err0r!

P.2d 1146, 1152-53 (1999)). Substantial evidence

might accept

trial."

existence 0f any fact that

less

probable than

it

is

0f consequence

would be without

the

Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008)Err0r!

Whether a

fact is

relationship t0 the legal theories presented

by

0f consequence 0r material
the parties. State

v.

is

determined by

its

Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671,

227 P.3d 9 1 8, 925 (2010). Whether evidence
de novo. State

Joy, 155 Idaho

v.

The

1, 6,

is

relevant

is

a question 0f law that this Court reviews

304 P.3d 276, 281 (2013)

court impermissibly expanded the duty 0f care established in
Harrigfeld that Wise owed Billy as a third party beneﬁciary 0f a testamentary

B.

district

instrument

Elements 0f a malpractice action.

1.

In Soigm'er

v.

256 P.3d 730, 732 (201 1)

Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 324,

this

Court held:

There are four elements t0 a legal-malpractice claim: (1) there is an attorneyclient relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; (2) the defendant lawyer

owed

a duty 0f care t0 the plaintiff; (3) the lawyer breached the duty; and (4) the
was a proximate cause 0f the client's damage. Johnson v.

lawyer's negligence

JonesError.’

Bookmark not deﬁned,

103 Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654

(1 982).

Billy did not

2.

have an attorney-client relationship With Wise.

Regarding the ﬁrst required element, in Idaho the general rule

is

that “an attorney will

held liable for negligence only t0 his 0r her client and not t0 someone with

be

whom the attorney does

not have an attorney-client relationship.” Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 137, 90 P.3d 884,

887 (2004). Indeed, the general rule
the defendant

owes a duty

in torts is that

t0 the defendant.”

Udy

“n0

v.

liability arises

from the law 0f torts unless

Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 34 P.3d 1069

(2001). Accordingly, “the general rule has been that an attorney-client relationship with the

plaintiff is a prerequisite for holding the attorney liable for negligence in the

services.” Harrigfeld

In Berry

v.

v.

performance 0f legal

Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 137, 90 P.3d 884, 887 (2004).

McFarland, 153 Idaho

5, 9,

278 P.3d 407, 411 (2012),

this

Court held:

As

a general rule, n0 attorney-client relationship exists absent assent by both the
putative client and attorney. “An attorney-client relationship can be established

when the

sought for assistance in matters pertinent t0 his [0r her]
profession.” Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 934, 801 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1990). If
attorney

is

the attorney agrees t0 provide assistance, 0r engages in conduct that could

reasonably be construed as so agreeing, then there
relationship.

is

an attorney-client

The scope 0f the representation depends upon what

agreed t0 d0.
10

the attorney has

This Court recognized in Berry certain situations where this general rule would be relaxed,
holding:

There are also circumstances in which the existence 0f an attorney-client
relationship can exist based
is

upon the

attorney's failure t0 clarify

whom the attorney

representing where, under the circumstances, one 0f the parties could reasonably

believe that the attorney

is

representing that person's interests. Thus, the attorney-

client relationship also exists if the attorney has represented the client in a variety

0f matters over a period 0f time and the attorney is asked t0 perform services in
connection with a matter in which the client is involved, unless the attorney clearly
informs the client that the attorney

is

not representing the client with respect t0 that

matter.

Id. at 9-10,

278 P.3d

at

41 1-412.

In the context 0f a testamentary instrument, this Court ruled

upon

the issue 0f whether a

direct attorney-client relationship is required in order for the intended beneﬁciary

instrument t0 sue the drafting attorney for malpractice. In Harrigfeld

90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004)
person

,

this

v.

0f a testamentary

Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,

Court addressed the issue 0f whether, 0r in what circumstances, a

who was not a client 0f the defendant attorney could pursue a malpractice claim against the

drafting attorney 0f a testamentary instrument.

This court relaxed the priVity requirement, and

allowed a very narrow exception with a speciﬁcally deﬁned duty 0f care as follows:

an attorney preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty t0 the
beneﬁciaries named 0r identiﬁed therein t0 prepare such instruments, and if

[W]e hold

that

requested by the testator t0 have them properly executed, so as t0 effectuate the
testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments. If, as a proximate
result

0f the attorney's professional negligence, the

the testamentary instruments is frustrated in

whole

testator's intent as

0r in part

expressed in

and the beneﬁciary's

interest in the estate is either lost, diminished, 0r unrealized, the attorney
liable t0 the

beneﬁciary harmed.

Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 138, 90 P.3d at 888.

11

would be

In this suit,

it

was undisputed that Wise had an

represent her in her divorce from Bill Sr.

It

was

attorney-client relationship with Carolyn t0

also undisputed that

Wise represented Carolyn

in

the drafting and execution of her will.

As

well,

representing

it

him

was undisputed

that

Wise had an

attorney-client relationship with Brent,

as the personal representative in the probate 0f Carolyn’s estate.

It

was

also

undisputed that Wise represented Brent individually in the preparation 0f the 2012 Deed
transferring the parcel 0f property that

The

district court

found Billy had standing

Deed because Harrigfeld gave
0f Carolyn’s
Billy

was not part 0f Carolyn’s probate
t0 sue

Wise

estate.

for malpractice related t0 the

2012

Billy standing t0 sue for malpractice in the drafting and execution

will.

was not a

client

0f Wise, but was an heir in Carolyn’s

will.

It is

true

he had standing

under Harrigfeld t0 pursue a malpractice claim against Wise regarding the drafting and execution
0f Carolyn’s

will.

The

district court

found Wise prepared Carolyn’s

will,

and had

it

properly

executed, so as t0 effectuate Carolyn’s intent as expressed in the will. That should end the inquiry

under the duty 0f care established in Harrigfeld. Thus, Billy has n0 standing t0 pursue Wise for
malpractice in the preparation 0f the 2012

Deed based upon

the attorney-client priVity requirement and

deﬁned duty 0f care.

Further,

Berry.

n0 imputed

the Harrigfeld narrow exception t0

attorney-client relationship arises under the exception set forth in

Wise’s ﬁrst and only communication

0f the

letter t0 Billy that

that, “I represent

your brother, Brent

t0 Billy consisting

accompanied the 2012 Deed speciﬁcally informed Billy

Kyser, in legal matters, including the administration 0f your mother’s estate.”

12

R p.

552.

In conclusion, Billy

had standing

t0 sue

Wise

for the alleged malpractice in the drafting 0f

Carolyn’s 2002 will. However, he lacked standing t0 sue Wise for malpractice related t0 the 2002

Deed

0r the

2012 Deed.

13

The

3.

probate

The

court erred in ﬁnding the

trial

“Because Carolyn’s Will

Harrigfeld, Mr. Wise, as the attorney

who prepared the

effectuate Carolyn’s intent as expressed in the Will.”

the instrument.

it

3”

reads 0n

R p.

Will, Carolyn’s intent

to

559.

was

its

clear

is

district court

clearly,

owed

concluded, “Accordingly, as the attorney

and have
558.

it

The

properly executed, so as t0

trial

court also found, “Here,

View 0f everything within the four corners 0f

Kyser,

t0 ‘devise

Jr.,

and bequeath the

who prepared Carolyn’s

under Harrigfeld, t0 prepare the Will, and have

which was

of her estate t0 her children, Brent Kyser and Billy E. Kyser,
Billy’s share held in trust for distribution t0

R p.

in equal shares.”

effectuate Carolyn’s intent as expressed in the Will,

R p.

a duty t0 Billy and Brent (who

concluded, “Looking within the four corners 0f the

and primarily,

my children, Brent Kyser and Billy E.

care] t0 Billy,

R p.

a testamentary instrument, under

and unambiguous, and thus her intent can be ascertained

face 0r ‘from a full

The

is

Will,

are the beneﬁciaries identiﬁed therein) t0 prepare the Will,

from the Will as

place was part 0f Carolyn’s

estate.

district court held,

the language 0f Carolyn’s Will

home

0f my estate

The

district court

559.

Will, Mr.

Wise owed a duty

[0f

properly executed, so as t0

it

t0 devise

Jr.,

entire

and bequeath the entire

in equal shares;

him for the duration ofhis

life.”

and

(Emphasis in

t0

have

original).

559.

The

district court

did not explain in this portion 0f the

comprised the entire 0f Carolyn’s

estate.

However,

memorandum decision which assets

in a later portion

the district court held, “Although the Court has found that the

interest,

and

thus,

0f the

memorandum decision,

2002 Deed

n0 similar duty was owed by Mr. Wise under

that

deed

is

is

not a testamentary
further evidence 0f

Carolyn’s intent that her assets should be divided between her two sons upon her death...

Wise,

who had represented Carolyn in the preparation 0f the 2002 Deed,

Brent, individually, in the preparation 0f a 20 1 2

Mr.

subsequently represented

Deed that effectively rescinded Carolyn’ s intended

14

2002 Deed...”

disposition 0f the remainder interest in the

from this analysis

that the district court considered the

In arriving at the conclusion that the

0f Carolyn’s probate
district court relied

estate,

upon

it

R pp.

564-565. Thus,

it

can be gleaned

home place part 0f Carolyn’s probate estate.

2012 Deed

for the

home

appears from the district court’s

the testimony 0f the experts at

trial

place encompassed an asset

memorandum

opinion that the

regarding the assets in the probate

estate.

The

testimony from Defendant’s expert, Malcolm Dymkoski, which

district cited t0

it

found persuasive regarding the disposition 0f the assets in Carolyn’s estate as follows:

Turn

Q.

t0

page two 0f Exhibit

Now,

4.

the ﬁrst

two

lines

0f Carolyn Kyser’s

will provides that “I
children, Brent

hereby devise and bequeath the entirety 0f
Kyser and Billy E. Kyser Jr., in equal shares.”

my

estate t0

A.

Correct.

Q.

So, let’s say you’re the attorney that drafted this will and let’s say

the attorney that’s also probating the will,

A.

Okay.

Q.

And we know that the testator’s

estate t0

be

split

my

you were

okay?

intent at the very basic level

is

for her

equally between these two children; would you agree With

that?

A.

Yes.

Rp. 561

(Tr p. 324,

1.

14 —p. 325,

11

1-4; p. 325,

1.

17 —p. 326,

1.

14) (Emphasis

in record).

Dymkoski agreed Carolyn’s

was

intent as expressed in her will

equally between Brent and Billy. This testimony did not deﬁne the

The

district court also relied

upon

t0 split her probate estate

home place

as an estate asset.

the testimony 0f Plaintiff’s expert, P.J. Grabicki

regarding which assets comprised Carolyn’s entire estate.

Grabicki’s testimony demonstrated a

fundamental misperception about the documents which comprised Carolyn’s testamentary
instruments. This mistake distorted Grabicki’s

View 0f the probate

15

assets held in Carolyn’s estate.

The fundamental misconception held by Grabicki was
testamentary document. Tr p. 88,
the

1.

2002 Deed and the

22 —

was
92,

p. 91,

1.

23.

9

1.

p. 89,

3.

1.

Premised upon

this mistake,

From

t0 vest her estate (including the

Tr

p. 90,

home

Tr

place) equally in Brent and Billy.

p. 91,

1.

24 —

p.

8.

1.

the district court.

Reading the

R p.

Deed was a testamentary instrument was

564. Nonetheless,

to her children in

estate.

entirety 0f the district court’s decision in context,

home

2002

in

which she retained a

expressly rejected

appears the district court relied upon Grabicki’s

it

it is

apparent the district

court interpreted the entirety 0f Carolyn’s estate under her will t0 include the

life estate.

Since the

home

district court

place deeded

considered the

place t0 be part 0f Carolyn’s probate estate covered in her testamentary plan, the district

court held

Wise

frustrated the testator’s testamentary intent as expressed in the will in preparing

2012 Deed, thus causing Billy

from

a

these two documents, Grabicki concluded Carolyn’s intent as a testator

mistaken logic in determining the entire 0f Carolyn’s

the

itself

Grabicki opined

will comprised Carolyn’s estate plan regarding her estate assets.

Grabicki’s View that the 2002

by

—

2002 Deed was

that the

his

t0 lose his interest in a portion

mother outside 0f probate.

Idaho Code § 15-1-201(16)
relevant part: “‘Estate’

means

all

R pp.

564-565.

sets out the

deﬁnition 0f an estate in probate and provides in

property 0f the decedent, including community property 0f the

surviving spouse subject t0 administration...”

“...any

0f the real property he acquired

A devises is deﬁned in LC.

§ 15-1-201(12) to

mean

person designated in a will t0 receive a devise. In the case 0f a devise t0 an existing

0r trustee, 0r t0 a trustee 0r trust described

beneﬁciaries are not devisees.”

A

devise

is

by

will, the trust 0r trustee is the devises

deﬁned

16

at

LC.

trust

and the

§ 15-1-201(1 1) as follows: “...when

used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition 0f real 0r personal property and when used as a
verb,

means

t0 dispose

0f real 0r personal property by will.”

A life estate terminates 0n the death 0f the holder 0f the estate for life.
the extinguishment 0f the life estate, the

Thus, upon Carolyn’s death, her

remaindermen have a fee simple

life estate

LC.

right

§ 55-203.

Upon

0f possession.

was extinguished, and she had n0 remaining

Id.

interest in

the real property t0 devise 0r administer pursuant t0 the terms 0f her will.

The

district court

determined that the

home placed owned in fee
was

upon

the extinguishment 0f Carolyn’s life estate

565.

This ﬁnding misapplies the above law, and

evidence. Carolyn’s

life estate

home place t0

it

the

was not

is

simple by Brent and Billy

part 0f Carolyn’s entire estate.

R pp.

564-

unsupported by substantial and competent

extinguished upon her death. Because Carolyn had n0 interest in
subj ect t0 administration in the probate. Since the

home place

subj ect t0 administration as part 0f Carolyn’s estate, Wise’s preparation 0f the

2012 Deed

devise,

was not

did not frustrate Carolyn’s testamentary intent as demonstrated in her will t0 divide her probate

estate equally

between her two children.

Simply put, the

real property

encompassed within the 2012 Deed was not part 0f Carolyn’s

probate estate. The district court’s ﬁnding that the real property was part 0f Carolyn’s entire estate

is

incorrect based

analysis

upon an

by considering

relied

upon by the

owed

t0 Billy as a

application 0f the law t0 the facts. Thus, the district court erred in in

the

home

district court t0

place as part 0f Carolyn’s probate estate, which

was

its

the basis

extend Harrigfeld and ﬁnd that Wise breached his duty 0f care

beneﬁciary by preparing the 2012 deed that effectively rescinded Carolyn’s

intended disposition 0f the remainder interest Billy received under the 2002 Deed.

17

The district court erred in ﬁnding the law recognized a duty 0f care
owed by Wise t0 Billy regarding the preparation 0f the 2012 Deed

4.

The

district court

held “Because Carolyn’s Will

Harrigfeld, Mr. Wise, as the attorney

who prepared the

is

Will,

are the beneﬁciaries identiﬁed therein) t0 prepare the Will,

a testamentary instrument, under

owed

a duty t0 Billy and Brent (who

and have

it

properly executed, so as t0

Wise did not dispute below

effectuate Carolyn’s intent as expressed in the Will.” R. p. 479.

he owed Billy and Brent as beneﬁciaries a duty 0f care in the preparation 0f Carolyn’s will
it

have

t0

prepared and properly executed as t0 effectuate Carolyn’s intent as expressed in the will.

Wise does not dispute 0n appeal

that this is the duty

that

Id.

0f care he owed Billy as a beneﬁciary in the

preparation 0f Carolyn’s will.

The

Nor

district court

found n0 Violation 0f the above duty 0f care in the preparation 0f the

did the district court identify any bequest in Carolyn’s will that Billy lost because

will.

Wise did

not prepare Carolyn’s will t0 effectuate her intent as expressed in the will.
Rather, the district court observed that

conveying

to Billy

Wise prepared

and Brent a one-half remainder

interest.

the

R p.

2002 Deed

48 1. The

t0 the

home

district court

place

noted as

signiﬁcant the fact that Wise prepared Carolyn’s will that distributed Carolyn’s entire estate t0

Brent and Billy in equal shares.

Id.

The

district court

preparation 0f the 2012 deed violated the duty 0f care

then posed the question whether the

Wise owed

inquiry, the district court conﬂated the duty 0f care recognized

stating t0

trial

Billy.

Id.

by law with

answer the question 0f the duty 0f care Wise owed Billy

In answering this

the standard 0f care,

in drafting the

2012 Deed, the

court must identify the local standard 0f care from expert testimony, and the Idaho Rules 0f

Professional Conduct.

R p.

481. This analysis

is

wrong.

18

In Idaho, a cause 0f action for negligence requires a duty, recognized

by law, requiring

defendant t0 conform t0 a certain standard 0f conduct. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.

155 Idaho 942, 947-948, 318 P.3d 932, 937-938 (2014). The duty 0f care
a question offact. In Jones

is

Massey,

a legal obligation, not

Stames, 150 Idaho 257, 260, 245 P.3d 1009, 1012 (201

v.

v.

the

1), this

Court

held:

"N0

liability exists

sought

under the law 0f

owed a duty t0

torts unless the

person from

the allegedly injured party." Vickers

v.

whom

Hanover

relief is

Constr. C0.,

Ina, 125 Idaho 832, 835, 875 P.2d 929, 932 (1994). The existence 0f a duty 0f care
is a question 0f law over which this Court exercises free review. Coghlan v. Beta
Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 400, 987 P.2d 300, 312 (1999); Turpen
Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999).

v.

The duty 0f care owed by an attorney t0 a beneﬁciary recognized by this court in Harrigfeld
regarding testamentary instruments

is t0

draft

them t0 reﬂect the

intent 0f the testator as expressed

within the will, and assure they are properly executed if requested.
Violation 0f this duty 0f care.

Instead,

it

The

district court

found n0

determined that Wise owed Billy a duty 0f care as a

beneﬁciary 0f the will regarding the transfer 0f a parcel 0f property that was not encompassed
within the probate estate.

The Idaho Court 0f Appeals has addressed
representing a personal representative

owed

what duty 0f care an attorney

an heir t0 protect estate assets based upon a third-

Stoker, 138 Idaho 265, 267, 61 P.3d 622,

party beneﬁciary analysis.

In Allen

2002), the Court 0f Appeals

was requested

v.

t0

the issue 0f

t0 extend the duty that

624 (Ct.App.

an attorney owed an intended

beneﬁciary in the drafting 0f testamentary documents t0 reﬂect the same duty owed t0 the heirs in
the probate 0f the estate.

The Idaho Court 0f Appeals held

that heirs

0f an estate have n0

negligence cause 0f action against an attorney representing a personal representative because that
attorney does not represent the heirs and therefore

owes them n0

duty. Allen

v.

Stoker, 138 Idaho

265, 267, 61 P.3d 622, 624 (Ct.App. 2002) (cited with approval in Harrigfeld).
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The Court 0f

Appeals held the attorney representing the personal representative was not hired

t0

beneﬁt any

particular heir, but “assists the personal representative in the performance 0f his 0r her duties.” Id.

The Court 0f Appeals
(1

relied

upon

994) t0 identify three reasons
(1) the estate

and

the holding in Trask

v.

Wash.2d 835, 872 P.2d 1080

Butler, 123

why the recognition 0f such a duty was

inappropriate,

which were:

beneﬁciaries are incidental, not intended, beneﬁciaries 0f that

its

attorney-personal representative relationship; (2) the estate heirs

may bring

a direct

cause 0f action against the personal representative for breach 0f ﬁduciary duty; and
(3) the unresolvable conﬂict 0f interest an estate attorney encounters in deciding

whether

t0 represent the personal representative, the estate, 0r the estate heirs

unduly burdens the legal profession.
Allen

v.

Stoker, 138 Idaho at 267, 61 P.3d at 624.

The Court 0f Appeals

further observed if “malpractice

by

may be

representative causes injury t0 an estate, the injury ordinarily

malpractice action brought by the personal representative.” Allen
61 P.3d 622, 624 (Ct. App. 2002). If 0n the other hand injury

0f a personal representative in the administration 0f the

is

the attorney for a personal

v.

rectiﬁed through a

Stoker, 138 Idaho 265, 267,

caused t0 an heir by the actions

estate, “the

personal representative

be sued by the heirs. Unlike the attorney, the personal representative owes a ﬁduciary duty t0

and a Violation 0f this duty

is

expanded the duty 0f care owed by an attorney beyond the

duty found in Harrigfeld, supra, and the duty

the probate 0f the will,

who

owed

heirs,

actionable.” Id.

In this case, the district court

effectively held an attorney

may

rej ected in

Allen

v.

Stoker, supra.

The

district court

drafted a will, and then represented a personal representative in

a duty 0f care t0 the beneﬁciary 0f the will t0 assure any property

received outside 0f probate jointly by the beneﬁciaries from the testator 0f the will continue t0 be

held in the same manner

it

was received. This

is

not the holding ofHarrigfeld, nor is

it

a reasonable

extension 0f the narrow exception t0 priVity recognized in Harrigfeld, and the duty t0 the

beneﬁciary deﬁned in Harrigfeld. Further,

it is

contrary t0 the Allenholding.
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N0

case law exists

which supports the

district court’s

broad expansion 0f the duty 0f care owed by the drafting

attorney 0f a testamentary instrument t0 the beneﬁciary t0 assure that the testator’s grant 0f real

property outside 0f probate remain held by the recipients in the same manner as
It

it

was

received.

appears the district court relied upon expert testimony t0 support this expansion 0f the

duty 0f care. Idaho Rule 0f Evidence 702 allows an expert t0 testify

if the

the trier 0f fact t0 understand the evidence 0r t0 determine a fact that

Emergency Med. ofldaho,
expert’s opinion

the trier 0f fact.

is

is

testimony will assist
in issue.

Swallow

P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003) (emphasis added).

not inadmissible because

I.R.E. 704.

it

embraced an ultimate issue 0f fact

Because the existence 0f a duty 0f care

court’s determination, the legal conclusions 0f expert witnesses

Public Employees Retirement System

d0 not

is

t0

v.

An

be decided by

a matter 0f law for the

settle the analysis.

Kansas

Kutak Rock, 273 Kan. 481, 495, 44 P.3d 407, 416 (2002).

v.

That determination remains the province 0f the court.

T0 support the expansion 0f the duty 0f care,

the

trial

court cited t0 testimony

by Dymkoski

as follows:

Okay,

Q.

representative
judicial

let's

say

the

personal

— and continue

economy

representative and

we'll
let' s

say.

—

you're

the facts 0f that

And

let's

representing

same question

the

personal

for purposes 0f

say you're representing the personal

say the personal represent [sic] in administering the estate

asks you t0 prepare a deed that distributes an interest in the personal representative

what the will provide for.
Now, remember, you were the attorney that prepared the Will. Would it be a
breach 0f your duty t0 those beneﬁciaries t0 prepare that deed in a way
different than What is provided for in that Will?
and an

interest in the other sibling that is different than

Assuming that the intent 0f the testator from the four corners, from the
language contained in the Will is clear, yes, it would be improper for the
attorney, if I had done that. It would be improper for me then t0 prepare

A.

documentation t0 allow the distribution otherwise,

R p.

561, (emphasis in decision).

21

yes.

The hypothetical above posed

t0

Dymkoski sought an opinion about

attorney representing a personal representative

owed

t0 a

beneﬁciary in the preparation 0f a deed

for distribution 0f real property within the probate estate in a

In

will.

Dymkoski’s opinion,

would be improper

it

Although not clear from the answer,
indicate a personal representative

0f the duty 0f care

manner different than provided

for the attorney t0 prepare such a deed.

owes a beneﬁciary a duty 0f care,
If

it

was intended

it

would be a wrong statement

t0 import that advising the personal

representative t0 disregard the will absent circumstances that allowed otherwise

0f malpractice,

it

would be

correct. Nonetheless, this

real property that is unrelated t0 the probate estate.

the duty 0f care

owed

t0 a

in the

use 0f the phrase “improper” was intended t0

if Dymkoski’s

set forth in Allen.

the duty 0f care an

would be an

act

testimony bears n0 relation t0 the transfer 0f

More

importantly, an expert does not establish

beneﬁciary 0f a will by an attorney regarding a non-probate parcel 0f

property.

The

trial

court also referenced Grabicki’s testimony as establishing the duty 0f care.

discussed earlier in this brief, Grabicki erroneously believed the 2002

testamentary instrument. Tr
the

1.

2002 Deed and the

22 —

was
92,

p. 91,

1.

23.

p. 88,

1.

8.

From

Based upon

— p.

89,

1.

3.

Premised upon

this mistake,

itself

a

Grabicki testiﬁed

will comprised Carolyn’s estate plan regarding her estate assets.

Tr

p. 90,

these two documents, Grabicki concluded Carolyn’s intent as a testator

t0 vest her estate (including the

1.

9

Deed was

As

his mistaken

home

View

place) equally in Brent and Billy.

that the

Tr

p. 91,

1.

24 —

p.

2002 Deed was a testamentary instrument along

with the will, Grabicki testiﬁed the 2012 Deed was inconsistent with the testator’s intent because

it

frustrated the testator’s estate plan.

Regarding the duty 0f
concerning

Tr p. 94,

1.

19

— p.

95,

care, the district court cited

when Wise’s duty 0f care

t0 Billy arose.

22

R p.

1.

25.

with approval Grabicki’s testimony

562. Grabicki opined that the duty 0f

care arose in

2002 when Wise was working with Carolyn 0n her

erroneously believed included the

home

place.) Id.

under Harrigfeld “rekindled” when Wise agreed

estate plan

(which Grabicki

owed

Grabicki opined that the duty 0f care

t0 represent the personal representative. Id.

Grabicki opined at that point Wise had a duty 0f care t0 both heirs, Billy and Brent, “t0 carry out

Grabicki concluded “The deed doesn’t carry out the estate plan,

the estate plan.” Id.

it

frustrates

the estate plan.” Id.

Besides being premised upon a faulty assumption (that the 2002 Deed was a testamentary

merely Grabicki’s View 0f the duty 0f care owed

instrument), this opinion

is

the Harrigfeld holding.

In cross-examination, Grabicki conceded he

0f the Harrigfeld holding, and testiﬁed
that

it

was

t0 a

beneﬁciary under

was expressing

his opinion that Harrigfeld stood for the proposition

an attorney’s duty 0f care in drafting a testamentary instrument could be rekindled

drafting attorney later probated the will.

Tr

p. 13 1,

1.

25 —

p. 132,

1.

11.

care t0 an heir regarding a non-probate asset unless requested t0 take

some

action

representative, 0r unless the non-probate asset created an estate tax issue.

Grabicki testiﬁed

it

was opinion based upon

Tr

analysis because

this Court.

it is

The

is

wrong.

More

importantly,

unrelated t0 a question 0f fact.

trial

court erred in relying

by

a duty 0f

the personal

p. 132,

R p.

discussed earlier in this brief, Grabicki’s opinion 0f the duty 0f care

as established in Harrigfeld

owe

11.

12-17.

the holding in Harrigfeld that any attorney

represents a personal representative in an estate had a responsibility t0 heirs.

As

if the

Grabicki expressed the

opinion under Harrigfeld that the attorney for the personal representative did not

by

his opinion

Duty

is

it is

23

11.

5-12.

Wise owed

Billy

irrelevant t0 the district court’s

a questioned 0f law t0 be determined

0n Grabicki’s testimony

the holding 0f Harrigfeld t0 include a duty 0f care

137,

who

owed by

as the basis for extending

a personal representative t0 a

beneﬁciary t0 assure any property received outside 0f probate jointly by the beneﬁciaries from the
testator

0f the will continue

t0

be held in the same manner

it

was

received.

The district court erred in holding that the preparation 0f the 2012
Deed violated the standard 0f care owed Billy based upon enumerated
Idaho Rules 0f Professional Conduct Which prohibit an attorney from

C.

representing a client under a conﬂict 0f interest

The

district court

248 P.3d 1256 (201
While the

acknowledged

1), this

in Stephen

v.

Sallaz

&

Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521,

Court held:

be used as a basis t0 impose civil
liability, see I.R. C.P., Scope, 1] 20, they are informative 0f the standard 0f care that
an attorney owes t0 his 0r her client. See Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 705,
652 P.2d 650, 653 (1982) (using professional responsibility rules t0 identify the
standard 0f care owed by an attorney acting under a conﬂict 0f interest).

R pp.

rules 0f professional conduct cannot

562-563.

Dymkoski

testiﬁed that

Wise did not

Violate

any rule 0f professional conduct

in

representing Brent as the personal representative 0f the estate 0f Carolyn and representing Brent

individually at the

The
t0 the facts

upon
held

the

it

same

district court

Tr p. 297, 12-22.

determined there were several Rules 0f Professional Conduct applicable

0f the case comprised 0f I.R.P.C.

1.9(a), 1.7(a)(2)

expanded duty 0f care imposed by the

was painfully obvious

rules in preparing the

R p.

time.

that

district court.

and 4.3 which Wise violated based

R pp.

562-564. The

district court

Wise was operating under a conﬂict 0f interest premised 0n these

2012 Deed arising from the expanded duty 0f care found by the

district court.

564.

Wise did not Violate I.R.P.C.

1.

1.9

Idaho Rule 0f Professional Conduct 1.9(a) provides:

A

lawyer

who

has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter

represent another person in the

same 0r a

substantially related matter in

24

which

that

person’s interest are materially adverse t0 the interest 0f the former client unless
the former client gives informed consent,

The

conﬁrmed

returned t0 the theme that

district court

in writing.

Wise had a duty

t0 abide

by Carolyn’s

testamentary intent t0 devise and bequeath the entire ofher estate t0 Brent and Billy in equal shares

t0

deﬁne the duty Wise owed Carolyn

Rule

1.9, the

court emphasized the

rescind 0n behalf 0f a

R p.

as a former client.

comment language

that a

564.

Reciting t0

new client a contract drafted 0n behalf 0f the former client. R p.

by

t0 a contract

drafting the

The

1

of

lawyer could not properly seek t0

acknowledging the 2002 Deed was not a testamentary instrument, the

2002 Deed

comment

district court

563. While

likened the

and held Wise effectively rescinded Carolyn’s contract with her children

2012 Deed

0f Rule

in contravention

Carolyn in the divorce. However, the

Wise had an

ﬂawed.

district court’s analysis is

R p.

1.9(a).

district court

564.

attorney-client relationship with

did not analyze whether Wise’s drafting 0f the

2002 quitclaim deed concomitant t0 the property settlement agreement in the divorce was the same
0r a substantially related matter as drafting the
Billy and Brent under the

2002 Deed.

It

was

A matter is substantially related if
there otherwise

is

it

2012 Deed quitclaiming the property acquired by

not.

"involve[s] the

same transaction 0r

legal dispute 0r if

a substantial risk that conﬁdential factual information as would normally have

been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the
Cmt.

3.

C.J.S. Attorney

&

subsequent matter." I.R.P.C.
substantially related,

7A

1.9,

In analyzing

when

client's position in the

a representation

is

the

same 0r

Client § 207 provides the following guidance:

In order for an attorney t0 be disqualiﬁed

from representing a

client 0r interest

adverse t0 a former client's interests 0r conﬁdences, the subj ect matter 0f the current

and former representations must be the same 0r substantially

related, 0r there

must

be a relationship with the conﬁdential information previously acquired.

The

substantial relationship test

interests involving

former

is

the keystone 0f the law

clients. In

0n

attorneys' conﬂicts 0f

order for an attorney t0 be disqualiﬁed from

25

representing a client adverse t0 a former client's interests 0r conﬁdences, the subject

matter 0f the current and the former representations must be the same 0r

must be a relationship between the current matter and
the conﬁdential information previously acquired, and the present and former
interests must be materially adverse.
substantially related, 0r there

For

this purpose, the

0r applied strictly,

term "substantially related"

meaning

that a

is

pending matter

given a narrow interpretation,
is

substantially related t0 the

subject matter 0f the attorney's prior representation if the relationship

is

patently

and the issues involved are identical 0r essentially the same. The subjects 0f
the prior and current representations must be rationally linked in the sense that
information material t0 the evaluation, prosecution, settlement, 0r accomplishment
0f the former representation, given its factual and legal issues, is also material t0
the evaluation, prosecution, settlement, 0r accomplishment 0f the current
representation, given its factual and legal issues. A substantial relationship exists if
the similarity between the two representations is enough t0 raise a common-sense
inference that what the attorney learned from the former client will prove useful in
clear

representing another client

7A C.J.S. Attorney &
The

whose

Client §

subject matter 0f the

207

interests are adverse.

(last Visited

November

2002 representation was a

11, 2019).

legal dispute consisting 0f a divorce,

and the attendant settlement 0f the community debt and property. The 2002 Deed was prepared
as part 0f the property settlement

the

community real

one tenant in

property.

common t0

agreement reached by Carolyn and

The 2012 Deed was a transfer 0f granted real property

interest

from

the other.

The matters were not

substantially related.

she received in the divorce, nor did

Further, there

Bill in the divorce t0 divide

was not a

in the divorce representation

it

It

did not attempt t0 divest Carolyn 0f anything

contest the provisions 0f the property settlement agreement.

substantial risk that Carolyn’s conﬁdential information obtained

would materially advance Brent’s position

Deed. The deed required the names 0f the tenants in

common and a legal description,

were a matter ofpublic record. Thus, Wise did not Violate Rule
Deed.

26

in preparation

1.9, I.R.P.C.,

by

0f the 2012
all

of which

drafting the

2012

Wise did not Violate I.R.P.C.

2.

The
interest

district court also

with current

(a)

clients.

1.7(a)(2)

found Wise violated I.R.P.C.

Rule 1.7(a)(2) provides

Except as provided in paragraph

in relevant part:

a lawyer shall not represent a client if

(b),

the representation involves a concurrent conﬂict 0f interest.
interest exists
***

which addresses conﬂicts 0f

1.7(a)(2),

A concurrent conﬂict 0f

if:

(2) there is a signiﬁcant risk that the representation

materially limited

by

0f one or more clients Will be

the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or

a third person or by the personal interests 0f the lawyer, including family and domestic
relationships.

The

district court

found Wise violated Rule

owed

1.7(a)(2), I.R.P.C.

The

district court

Wise had

responsibilities,

Carolyn’s

estate.

of care,

Brent in his individual representation concerning the 2012 Deed.

to

R

i.e.

The

565.

a duty 0f care, t0 Brent as the personal representative 0f

district court

observed Wise had responsibilities,

i.e.

Additionally, the district court observed

observed Wise had responsibilities,

owed

district court

Wise had responsibilities,

did not elaborate 0n

i.e.

The

Id.

owed

a duty

district court

a duty 0f care, t0 Carolyn as a former client.

and Brent as named beneﬁciaries under Carolyn’s

The

observed

i.e.

Id.

owed a duty 0f care, t0 Billy

will. Id.

why

it

held the representation 0f Brent as a current

client

both in the role 0f personal representative and individually in the preparation 0f the 2012

Deed

created a signiﬁcant risk that Wise’s representation

responsibilities (duties

would be materially limited by

his

0f care) t0 the above individuals.

Caroline and Bill reached a property settlement agreement without the assistance 0f

counsel which was placed 0f record in court 0n January
ethical obligations pursuant t0 I.R.P.C. 2.1

the

documents

was

t0 abide

in accordance with that agreement,

agreement. Tr p. 280,

1.

18

— p. 281,

1.

6, p.

282,

2002.

Tr

p.

282,

11.

by Carolyn’s settlement

16

—

24.

7-15.

Wise’s

decision, prepare

and d0 whatever was necessary

11.

27

7,

t0 carry out that

These were the responsibilities Wise

owed

t0

Carolyn as his current

client in the divorce.

When Carolyn became a former client, Wise had an obligation under I.R.P.C.
above not

t0 represent another client in a substantially related matter.

1.9 discussed

In other words, he could

take n0 action against Carolyn t0 invalidate the divorce 0r set aside the property settlement

agreement.

Regarding the preparation 0f Carolyn’s
client to prepare her will,

and

if

will,

Wise

requested by her t0 have

also

it

owed her a duty 0f care

as a current

properly executed, so as t0 effectuate

Carolyn’s intent as expressed in the will. The district court determined Wise met that obligation.

Once

that duty

was discharged,

as a former client

under Rule

Wise owed Carolyn a

1.9, I.R.P.C.,

duty 0f care not t0 represent another person in the same 0r a substantially related matter as the
drafting of the will in

which

that person’s interest

were materially adverse

t0 Carolyn’s interest.

For instances, Wise could not have assisted either beneﬁciary in contesting the terms 0f the
Turning to Brent and Billy as beneﬁciaries 0f Carolyn’s

estate,

will.

Wise owed them a duty 0f

care at the time he drafted the will t0 draft the will so as t0 effectuate Carolyn’s intent as expressed

in the will,

and

if

found Wise discharged

n0 obligation

t0

this duty.

them under

I.R.P.C. 1.9.

as the personal representative,

a current client representation, Wise’s responsibility

was

t0 prepare

have Brent appointed as a personal representative, and

was requested

district court

Neither Brent nor Billy were former clients 0f Wise, so he had

Next regarding the representation 0f Brent

t0 probate, t0

The

requested by Carolyn, t0 have the will properly executed.

in order then t0 administer the will.

Tr

p.

296,

11.

documents

t0 give

28

it

t0

admit the will

Brent whatever advice

8-14.

Finally regarding the representation of Brent in the drafting 0f the

the responsibility t0 draft the quitclaim deed and forward

which involved

2012 Deed, Wise had

t0 Billy as directed

by

Brent.

Having outlined the various
former clients and third
t0

parties,

Wise owed

responsibilities

and the duties owed

t0

t0

each 0f the above identiﬁed

Brent as a current

client, the inquiry turns

whether Wise’s representation 0f Brent would be materially limited by his responsibilities

t0

the other former clients and third party beneﬁciaries.

Law

7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at

A

§

182 notes:

"conﬂict 0f interest" denotes a situation in which regard for one duty tends t0

lead t0 disregard 0f another.

Stated otherwise, a conﬂict 0f interest exists

when

a

lawyer's duty 0n behalf 0f one client obligates the lawyer t0 take action prejudicial
t0

the

interests

0f another

A

client.

conﬂict 0f interest arises

when

the

circumstances 0f a particular case present a substantial risk that the lawyer's
representation 0f the client
lawyer's
client,

own

interests 0r

by

would be materially and adversely affected by

0r a third person, where an "adverse" interest

is

one that

antagonistic, detrimental, 0r unfavorable t0 another's interests.

is hostile,

opposed,

Attorneys cannot

represent conﬂicting interests 0r undertake t0 discharge inconsistent duties.
the

the

the lawyer's duties t0 another current client, a former

From

duty 0f loyalty issues the prohibition against representing clients with

conﬂicting interests.

Law

§

Examining ﬁrst the duty owed

t0

7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at

182

(last Visited

November 4 2019)

Carolyn as a former client, Wise’s representation 0f Brent

as the personal representative did not present a substantial risk that his duties t0 Carolyn as a former

client in the divorce

dividing the

would be

implicated.

community property

The 2012 Deed did not implicate
The same

is

assets

Wise

assisted Carolyn in obtaining a divorce

and debts 0f the community

at the

and

time 0f the divorce.

this duty.

true regarding the probate

0f the

will.

Wise’s representation 0f Brent as the

personal representative in probating Carolyn’s will did not require
prejudicial t0 Carolyn’s interests as a former client.

Wise

The probate 0f a

t0 take

will

any action

upon death

is

the

intended legal action following preparation of a will.

Examining next Wise’s responsibility

2012 Deed presented n0

t0

Carolyn as a former

client, the

preparation 0f the

substantial risk that Wise’s duties t0 Carolyn in the divorce

29

would be

implicated because

it

was not substantially related the

duties

Wise owed Carolyn as a former client

regarding the divorce proceeding.

Turning next t0 Billy’s status as a third party beneﬁciary in the drafting 0f the

will,

representing Brent as the personal representative in the probate did not involve a substantial risk

0f care owed

that his duty

t0 Billy t0 properly draft

Similarly, the drafting of the

when

beneﬁciary

and execute the will would be implicated.

2012 Deed did not implicate the duty 0f care Wise owed Billy as a

drafting the will.

The

3.

district

court erred in ﬁnding Wise

owed Billy a duty 0f care

in the

drafting 0f a transmittal letter t0 him, and violated the standard 0f care
related t0 that duty

Wise

sent Billy a transmittal letter

accompanied by the 2012 Deed indicating he

R p.

represented Brent in legal matters, including the administration 0f his mother’s estate.

It

also stated that Brent

desired Billy deed

and Billy were

him his

interest in the

for his review enclosed.

Id.

questions 0r comments.”

Id.

The

district court

now the owners 0f the home place.
home place, and

The closing 0f the

found the

z'fBilly agreed, there

letter indicated

Rule

letter violated

In dealing on behalf 0f a client With a person

Id.

is

concluded Brent

was quitclaim deed

“Please contact

4.3, I.R.P.C.

Who

It

552.

me

if

you have

Rule 4.3 provides:

not represented by counsel, a

lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s
role

in

the

matter,

the

lawyer shall make reasonable

efforts

t0

correct

the

misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person,
other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should
that the interests 0f such a person are or

conﬂict With the interests 0f the

As
beneﬁciary

by law,

know

have a reasonable possibility 0f being in

client.

previously expressed in this brief, a duty 0f care an attorney owes t0 a third party

is

a matter 0f law imposed 0n the attorney by law.

the attorney

is

Once a duty 0f care

required t0 conform t0 a certain standard 0f care.

30

Cumis

at

is

recognized

947-948, 318

P.3d

at

937-938.

As

indicated earlier in this brief,

Wise owed

Billy

n0 duty 0f care other than

in

the drafting and execution 0f Carolyn’s the will.

The

district court in its

memorandum

decision recognized Stephens, supra, holds that the

Idaho Rules 0f Professional Responsibility can only be used t0 inform the standard 0f care, but
they cannot be used t0 impose civil

Rule

4.3, I.R.P.C., t0

impose

The

liability.

civil liability

district court erred in this

matter because

it

used

0n Wise.

Recognizing that Billy was not Wise’s client regarding the drafting the 0f 2012 Deed, the
district court

found that Wise breached the standard 0f care by Violating the provisions 0f I.R.P.C.

Rule 4.3 by communicating with Billy and giving him legal advice when he was not represented.
This analysis

is

ﬂawed.

First, since Billy

was not a

communications with him.

client, there

was n0 duty 0f care owed him regarding

previously discussed, Berry,

supra,

circumstances where certain criteria are met.

The

ﬁrst criteria requires a failure

informed Billy he represented Brent.

It is

imposes an attorney-client relationship in

None 0f the Berry

criteria is

0n the part 0f the attorney

only

criteria is a

1.

in this case.

t0 clearly

inform the

Wise

criteria.

clearly

a failure t0 inform that the other Berry

reasonable belief under the circumstances by the unrepresented

party that the attorney represents their interest.

258,

if there is

met

0f consequence.

The second

p.

the

letter.

unrepresented party that they d0 not represent them combined with other

factors are

2012

The only method 0f extending a duty 0f care was through

imposition 0f an attorney-client relationship arising from the transmittal

As

the

1.

He was

Wise has never spoken

t0 Billy.

never contacted by another person 0n Billy’s behalf.

Billy’s conservator is

David Kalb, who

is

31

also his uncle.

Tr

p. 19,

11.

Tr

Tr

p.

p.

257,

1.

23 —

258,

1.

2-5.

4-7; p. 19,

1.

24 —

p.

20, 6. Kalb testiﬁed Billy can read, but

p. 57,

11.

0r retain

may not have

2-16. Kalb also testiﬁed Billy’s reading level

what he has

Tr

read.

p. 65,

11.

4-16.

There

an understanding 0f what he’s reading. Tr
is

is

a second grade level and he comprehend

n0 indication

Billy, 0r

anyone associated

with Billy, ever believed Wise represented Billy.

The

third criteria is a requirement that the attorney has represented the unrepresented

person in a variety 0f matters over a period 0f time. Wise has never represented Billy.

The

fourth criteria

matter in which the client
factor does not

there

was n0

come

is

is

that the attorney is asked t0

involved. Billy

into play because

is

perform a service in connection with a

certainly involved in the

none 0f the previous

basis t0 impose an attorney-client relationship between Billy and Wise.

based upon a perceived Violation 0f Rule 4.3, I.R.P.C.
professional rules d0 not create duties even though they

the district court

make

clear

proposed by the

imposed a duty based upon Wise

This was inappropriate because the

may

inform standards 0f care.

was persuaded by expert testimony from Grabicki

brought Rule 4.3, I.R.P.C., into play.

“did not

—

letter,

it

doesn’t say at

R pp.

all that if

in

ﬁnding

561-562. Grabicki testiﬁed

Billy

is

It

going t0 engage in the transaction that’s

he needs independent representation, independent counsel.”

it

Id.

true this letter identiﬁes t0 Billy that

he [Wise] represents his

brother, Brent Kaiser, in legal matters including the administration 0f his mother’s
estate?

Yes.

32

of

that, the letter itself

You were asked t0 100k at a letter that Mr. Wise sent t0 Billy Kaiser, Jr.
Q.
which is in the exhibit book in front 0f you as Exhibit 15 and has been admitted
dated August 24, 2012.
Isn’t

appears

that the closing

In cross examination, Grabicki testiﬁed:

A.

this

Thus, under Berry,

criteria are met.

Instead, despite the holding in Stephens, the district court

letter

2012 Deed. However,

Now, you indicated that he
your own representation, correct?
Q.

[Wise] should have also said you need t0 seek

A.

Correct.

Q.

In Rule 4.3 0f the Idaho Rules 0f Professional

attorney t0 advice
their

own

[sic]

an unrepresented person with

Conduct does

it

require an

whom they’re dealing t0

seek

independent legal advice?

A.

Ibelieve the “shall” does mandate

Q.

Does

it

that, yes, the

word

“shall.”

not say the lawyer shall not give legal advice t0 an unrepresented

party?

A.
Q.

Well, you have t0 read the entire paragraph.
Sure.
If you

would read

that

and point out

t0

me where it indicates he’s t0

inform

an unrepresented party t0 seek legal advice?
A.

Rule

4.3, Dealing with Unrepresented Person.
“In dealing on behalf 0f a client with a person

who

counsel, a lawyer shall not state 0r imply that the lawyer

So
Q.
matter?

let’s start there.

Does Mr. Wise

A.

N0.

Q.

In fact, he does the opposite, correct?

A.

Correct.

state that

is

he

is

not represented by

disinterested.”

is

disinterested in this

goes 0n t0 say, “When the lawyer knows 0r reasonably should know
that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the
It

lawyer shall make reasonable efforts

Q.

So

let’s

t0 correct the misunderstanding.”

stop there. Is there anything in the record

indicated Billy Kaiser misunderstood

Mr. Wise’s

I
A.
believe the last sentence 0f the
misunderstanding, especially by a lay person.

You’re assuming
Q.
misunderstanding?
A.

it

you reviewed that

role?

letter

can

could have. Is there any evidence

N0.
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it

lead

t0

that

did lead t0 that

In fact, testimony today is that Billy Kaiser Jr. doesn’t read; and if he
Q.
does read he doesn’t perceive What he’s reading. So isn’t it true this letter
could not have misguided him under 4.3 assuming that fact?

A.

Assuming that
“The lawyer

fact, correct.

shall not give legal advice t0

an unrepresented person other

0r reasonably should know
0f such person are 0r have a reasonable possibility 0f being in
conﬂict with the interests 0f the client.”

knows

than the advice t0 secure counsel if the lawyer
that the interests

Q.

Isn’t

A.

Correct. Well, n0, I take that back. It does advise

it

true this letter does not give Billy, Jr any legal advice?

him

that he’s the

half owner 0f that property.

Q.

It states

a conclusion that

parents’ property in

him and

Boundary County.

implications 0f that; that

is

brother are now owners 0f their
not legally advising him as t0 any

his

It’s

a conclusion that

is

correct?

could be either one.

A.

It

Q.

In What

A.

You’re advising as

Q.

And

way is

it

legal advice?

t0 the status 0f property.

then in his next sentence

it

says Brent

is

wanting him t0 deed his

interest t0 Brent, correct?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And then its worded in — if you agree, correct — it’s not saying you must you

shall,

A.

you need

That’s what

So

it

you agree?
says.

that’s not legal advice, is it?

N0,
?@?@P>.O

it’s if

that isn’t.

So he’s not advising him What t0 d0 With the property,

is

he?

He’s suggesting a course 0f conduct that’s urged by Brent.
Isn’t that

What

all

attorneys d0?

Yes.
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So, if I write Judge Buchanan and I say, I understand you own all these
Q.
burned-out businesses in Sandpoint which fortunately I don’t think she does, but
my client would like t0 purchase them for $50 because we don’t feel there’s a lot

0f value 0n them, if you agree please sign this purchase and
back t0 me, Ihaven’t told her she has t0 sign it, have I/

sale agreement, sent

it

N0.

A.

Ihave suggested a course 0f action, correct?
Correct.

It’s

a course 0f action

my client wants

suggested, correct?

?@9>.0.>p

Correct.

There’s n0 breach 0f the standard 0f care in doing that,

is

there?

N0, that’s not Where the breach occurs.
Tr. p. 127,

1.

1—p.

In conclusion,

letter that

131,

1.

Wise owed

10.

Billy

n0 duty 0f care

accompanied the 2012 Deed. As required

client relationship,

he clariﬁed

as a client in the drafting 0f the transmittal

in

whom he represented,

Berry t0 avoid imposition 0f the attorney-

and he provided n0 legal advice

suggesting a course 0f action Brent wished Billy t0 take.
care as a client under Rule 4.3, I.R.P.C.

independently by the

district court t0

Under Harrigfeld,

was

Rule

such,

Wise owed

4.3, I.R.P.C.,

Billy

n0 duty 0f

could not be utilized

civil liability.

The district court erred in ﬁnding Wise breached a duty owed t0 Billy Which
proximately caused Billy’s claimed injury

D.

estate

impose

Finally,

As

t0 Billy in

lost,

t0 recover for

breach the beneﬁciary must establish their interest in the

diminished 0r unrealized due t0 the failure 0f the attorney t0 draft the will t0

effectuate the testator’s intent as expressed in the will.

N0

evidence was submitted at

trial

indicating Billy did not receive in trust his half 0f Carolyn’s estate. Without such evidence, there

is

n0 basis

t0

ﬁnd Carolyn’s

testatory intent expressed in the will t0 distribute her estate equally
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between Brent and Billy was frustrated by Wise’s drafting and execution 0f the
Billy’s interest in the estate

Thus, the

was

district court erred in

will,

and that

either lost, diminished, 0r unrealized, as required in Harrigfeld.

ﬁnding

that

Wise’s alleged malpractice in drafting the 2012 Deed

caused the damages alleged by Billy.

CONCLUSION

IV.

Based upon the foregoing, the

trial

as a beneﬁciary 0f Carolyn’s will should

court’s

judgment

that

Wise owed

Billy a duty 0f care

be reversed.

Respectfully submitted this 22nd day 0f November, 2019.
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